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INSOLVENCY LAW AND REFORM IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Ronald Winston Harmer*
INTRODUCTION
m HE People's Republic of China is seeking to reform its insolvency
I law system. This may well occur in 1996. This contribution to the
Fordham Colloquium on International Insolvencies endeavors to
identify the major problems confronting China's potential adoption of
a modern traditional form of insolvency law, particularly with respect
to the vital but troublesome state-owned enterprise sector of its econ-
omy. This sector reigned paramount for over the thirty years in which
China employed a command economic regime. Today, that sector re-
mains vital to China's socialist market economy and is critically re-
lated to the proposal for insolvency law reform.
Ultimately, China may selectively employ traditional contemporary
insolvency law to the benefit of many state-owned enterprises. For
the many hopelessly debt-ridden state enterprises whose financial
condition is attributable to historical systemic problems, however,
such an approach is artificial, wasteful, and unnecessary. These insol-
vent state enterprises would best be served by a law empowering an
administrative body to take extraordinary measures to shut down,
conglomerate, or liquidate the businesses and their assets. There is
precedent for this approach. For example, the Board for Industrial
and Financial Reconstruction under the Sick Industrial (Companies
Special Provisions) Act 1985 of India and the Treuhandansalt legisla-
tion, enacted in 1990 for the purpose of dealing with the state enter-
prise system of the former East Germany.
Three dimensions exist with respect to Chinese insolvency law re-
form: legal, social welfare, and financial and accounting. These
dimensions are discussed below.
A. The Legal Dimensions
Until early this century, the law that had been decreed in China
over centuries through successive dynasties had little or no concern
with the maintenance of private rights in civil affairs. The laws dealt
only with the authority of government and criminal behavior. As best
one can gather, mercantile or commercial affairs, including debt re-
sponsibility, were left to custom and administered by prominent
merchants, guilds, or village elders. Regarding individuals in heavy
* The author is a Barrister & Solicitor in Australia. The following are being
published as Remarks from the Fordham University School of Law Graduate Collo-
quium on International Insolvencies.
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debt, creditors found solace in the ethic that the "son pays for the
debts of the father." Thus, it seems incongruous that China enacted
bankruptcy laws in 1906. Several reasons have been suggested for the
appearance of such laws at that time.
While the reasons for its approval are far from clear, some suggest
that China's generally weak and exhausted economy, coupled with its
weak and ineffective administration, had produced a growing fluctua-
tion and disparity in market prices of commodities. This severely af-
fected the trade of businessmen and the law may have been only a
hasty and temporary expedient. There is also a sign that the Qing
dynasty, fated to be the last of the dynastic regimes, was seriously af-
fected by foreign intrusion. In an attempt to somehow come to terms
with the "foreign devils," the dynasty may have been persuaded to
create a body of law more aligned with "Western" traditions. This
suggestion is supported further by the enactment of a reformed crimi-
nal code at around the same time. A third possibility is that the move-
ment toward legal reform generally may have resulted from the
urgings of Chinese intellectuals and others to follow something similar
to societal legal reform that is attributed to the Meiji Restoration in
Japan. Regardless of the motives for its enactment, these first bank-
ruptcy laws had a short life. Emperor Guang Xu approved the laws
on 1906, but annulled them in 1908. Little is known about their real
application.
Nonetheless, bankruptcy seems to have been regarded as important
for, in the year following the annulment of that first bankruptcy law, a
Japanese legal scholar was commissioned to draft a new bankruptcy
law. The collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912 prevented completion
of the commission. Between then and 1935, there seem to have been
some attempts to reintroduce a bankruptcy law. This could not have
been an easy task. Indeed, law making generally must have been spo-
radic and ineffective because of the disunity, if not chaos, in govern-
ment. In 1915, however, the legislative agency of the "Northern"
government published a draft bankruptcy law, modeled after German
and Japanese law. That draft was incorporated into a tentative or pro-
visional operation in 1926. It was known as the Provisional Statute
Governing Liquidation of Merchants' Debt. Again, little is known of
the application or effect of this law.
Some time later, the Kuomingtang Government published another
lengthy draft bankruptcy law, ultimately forming the foundation for a
Bankruptcy Law of the then Republic of China in 1935. Like much of
the law enacted by the Kuomingtang Government in China, it was
preserved in Taiwan following the defeat of the Kuomingtang in main-
land China and the removal of its government to Taiwan in 1949. It
remains the substance of the bankruptcy law of Taiwan. But, again,
the record of the application and effect of this insolvency law in main-
land China is vague and incomplete.
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The declaration of the official foundation of the Chinese People's
Republic on October 1, 1949 resulted in the abolition of all the laws
enacted by previous regimes. This, of course, included the 1935 bank-
ruptcy law.
In the 1950s, after the establishment of the new Republic, the Peo-
ple's Supreme Court adopted some temporary procedures, likened to
bankruptcy, to deal with the decline of the remnants of private enter-
prise in the new Republic. But once that task was completed, bank-
ruptcy procedures were not required in a society that embraced a
command economy and a state owned system of production. China
did not have another bankruptcy law until 1986, when the Law of
State Enterprise Bankruptcy was approved. Even then, however, that
law did not become effective until 1988 and it was not seriously ap-
plied until 1992.
Thus, for the forty-year period after 1949, there was virtually no
knowledge, and certainly no experience nor practical application, of a
bankruptcy law in China. Indeed, except for the recent exposure of
the last seven years, it can be said that China has never experienced
active application of bankruptcy law.
B. The Social Welfare Dimensions
The major related factor confronting the employment of a tradi-
tional form of insolvency law in China is the problem of social welfare,
particularly in the context of insolvent state-owned enterprises. The
history of social welfare in China over the last forty years or so dis-
closes reasons for their problems. In the immediate years following
the establishment of the new Republic in 1949, an initial legal and
economic framework for "labor" insurance was established, covering,
among other things, retirement provisions, compensation for work re-
lated injury and permanent disability, and medical cover. This
scheme, however, never included any provision for "unemployment."
One reason for this omission was that Article 42 of the Constitution of
the People's Republic of China contained a basic right (and, presuma-
bly, a correlative duty) to work for every citizen. The possibility that
there might be no work for the people was, consequently, not even
entertained. More importantly though, following the initial passage of
the "Cultural Revolution" in 1966 and 1967, the limited social welfare
framework that had been initiated was abandoned. The full burden
and responsibility for the total social welfare needs of workers was
shifted to state and collective enterprises. It was only from experi-
mental reforms in 1984 that a new government funded framework for
a social insurance system began to emerge again. It is still in its devel-
opmental infancy.
China's lack of a developed social insurance system impacts very
heavily on state enterprises experiencing financial difficulties and
faced with liquidation or, at best, reorganization. Under these circum-
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stances, unemployment and lack of funding to provide for retrenched
and retired workers, and a multitude of other social services threaten
social order.
C. The Financial and Accounting Dimensions
All insolvency laws relate to the financial position of an enterprise,
be it state or private. Only with the assistance of a modem accounting
system may the financial position of an enterprise fairly be ascer-
tained. The early identification of the financial state of an enterprise
is vital to the implementation of modem insolvency techniques of re-
organization or reconstruction. Also, the maintenance of full and
proper accounts avoids time and costs in a liquidation process. Any
reform of the insolvency law system of China therefore depends upon
reform, knowledge, and experience in the financial and accounting
areas.
The history of financial accounting in China shows, once again, a
significant lack of knowledge and experience. Even by the time of the
new Republic in 1949, accounting theory and practice in China was, at
best, rudimentary and certainly lacking in the basic concepts of profit/
loss and balance sheet accounting. Under the new Republic, national
production was "ordered" through a system of state enterprises and
collectives. Because of these circumstances and the practice of the
economics that are fundamental to a command economy, accounting
mechanisms were geared to provide basic cost and production infor-
mation. There was no increase in accounting knowledge and experi-
ence. Instead, accounting mechanisms that provided not much more
than production measurements became the model of accounting prac-
tice and reporting.
'The transition from command economics to market economics in
China in the mid-1980s required a revolution in accounting theory and
practice. It was not until mid-1993, however, that China began to
adopt recognized and accepted international accounting techniques
and standards.
I. Ti HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUMMARY OF THE
PRESENT BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
Although the observation has been made that the history of insol-
vency law in China presents difficulties, a more detailed survey of the
nature of those laws provides a deeper understanding of the problems
that confront the development and application of a modern insolvency
law. Some of this analysis may seem to only be of academic historical
relevance. But the absence of a continuity of an evolved system, cou-
pled with the failure to define basic concepts such as insolvency and




A. The Qing Dynasty Bankruptcy Law 1906
As mentioned, the bankruptcy law of the Qing dynasty was ap-
proved in April 1906 and it is said to have commenced operation in
July of that year. The law applied primarily to merchants (natural
person traders), although it also extended to joint stock companies
who had suffered losses in trade or in an unexpected situation. The
law provided primarily for a voluntary mechanism through an admin-
istrative, nonjudicial procedure. The merchant who had suffered
losses could file papers with the local authority and the local chamber
of commerce (or guild) declaring his financial difficulty.
After the administrative procedure and the necessary filings, a case
was then "administered" by the Chamber of Commerce. The prop-
erty of the merchant was taken in and sealed. The Chamber selected
a "strong" and "fair" man from the same trade or industry as the
merchant to serve as "trustee." With the assistance of the Chamber,
the trustee administered the case. The property was turned over to
him. He was empowered to sell it, collect debts and other assets, de-
termine the claims of creditors, and then make a distribution to the
creditors. The trustee was accorded fees as approved by the creditors.
Some of the traditional provisions of a bankruptcy law were present
in this law: creditors were required to establish their claims; no credi-
tors could receive favorable treatment; creditors holding security over
property might realize the property and account for the excess to the
trustee; distribution to creditors was pro rata; and there were various
provisions for the punishment of fraud and misappropriation. There
were, however, some particularly notable features of this law. For
example:
" if as a result of distribution of the property of the debtor to the
creditors there would be no assets left, the trustee might, with the
permission of creditors, take enough assets for two years for the
family to live on in order to show sympathy and care;
" government debts were not accorded priority and were ranked
with the debts owed to other creditors;
" there was a special chapter on debt payment extension arrange-
ments. If a merchant was short of working capital in a pressing
market or held outstanding accounts receivable so that he is not
able to discharge matured debts, he could apply to the Chamber
of Commerce for an extension of up to one year in which to meet
his debts to avoid bankruptcy and to maintain the business. The
Chamber then convened a meeting of creditors to decide on the
extension. If the debts were not paid within that time, application
for bankruptcy had to follow; and
" there were provisions for discharge which provided that if the cir-
cumstances of the bankruptcy were "excusable" (the law pro-
scribed circumstances which were not excusable, including
"playing the market which leads to money shortage that leads to
bankruptcy") and the dividend to creditors was fifty percent or
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more, the merchant could be exempted from the remainder of the
unpaid debts.
Although this law was abandoned in 1908, some aspects of its philoso-
phy were to reemerge in the Kuomingtang law of 1935.
B. The Kuomingtang Bankruptcy Law of 1935
The 1935 bankruptcy law was passed on July 17, 1935 and imple-
mented on May 1, 1937. It revived the involvement of the Chamber of
Commerce in cases concerning merchants (a feature of the 1906 law),
but only as a source for engineering a possible compromise or compo-
sition. A judicially managed process also facilitated comprises and ad-
ditionally provided for bankruptcy proceedings through a judicial
process. The law was directed principally at individual traders but
also extended to companies, partnerships, and deceased debtors
(although, in respect of the latter category, it somewhat predictably
fixed the heir with the obligation to pay from which the heir might
only escape through the mechanism of bankrupting the estate).
Jurisdiction was triggered when a debtor was unable to discharge
liability. This was probably intended to mirror the continental Euro-
pean notion of "cessation of payments."
The local Chamber of Commerce was involved significantly in pro-
viding people to serve in an administrative/quasi-trustee capacity in
bankruptcy or conciliation cases.
The 1935 law was in force until the foundation of the new Republic
in 1949. Thirty six years elapsed before "bankruptcy" was once again
mentioned in a Chinese law.
C. The "Bankruptcy" Regulations of Shenyang In Liaoning
Province in 1985
The first mention of the word "bankruptcy" in a post-1949 law ap-
pears in municipal, rather than national regulations. Enacted by the
Shenyang City Municipal Government on February 9, 1985, the regu-
lations were collectively known as "Bankruptcy of Urban Collective
Industrial Enterprises." The method by which these regulations were
promulgated is quite peculiar. One must question the competence of
a municipal authority to make bankruptcy regulations. It has been
explained that the regulations were made in response to a pressing
need for insolvency measures in Shenyang City. The local authority
apparently could not wait for the enactment of a national law. Ac-
cordingly, it implemented "trial measures" to deal with a number of
collective industrial enterprises which were known severely and finan-
cially to be deficient.
It seems that the initial idea for this "experiment" was to involve
the People's Court in the city. The Court declined to become in-
volved, however, because it doubted the local authority's power to
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enact such legislation. The regulations as published therefore pro-
vided only for administrative handling of bankruptcy cases through
the local industrial and commercial bureau.
The regulations applied only to "collective industrial enterprises."
They provided that if such an enterprise had "incurred debts in excess
of the value of its assets" (a balance sheet test), the enterprise would
be regarded as insolvent. An enterprise would also be regarded as
having reached "the line of bankruptcy" if it had incurred losses for
two years (for reasons other than the result of the dictates of govern-
ment policy) and its debts exceeded eighty percent of its assets. If an
enterprise reached that "line," the regulations dictated that the enter-
prise would have one year to adjust its financial difficulties.
The local industrial and commercial bureau was empowered to ar-
range meetings with the management of a "bankrupt" enterprise.
Banks and creditors would be invited to discuss the formation of a
special supervisory committee to investigate and oversee the property
and assets of the enterprise.
Particular provisions ensured that employees were reasonably pro-
tected. Shenyang might justly be credited with the first attempt in
China to establish a "bankruptcy fund" (other than by sole recourse to
the assets of the enterprise) to be used to provide living allowances to
employees of bankrupt enterprises.
D. The Civil Law 1986
"Bankruptcy" was first mentioned in a national law in the General
Principles of the Civil Law approved on April 12, 1986. Article 45 of
that law provided that the legal person status of a "corporation" may
be terminated by, among other events, a "legal declaration of bank-
ruptcy." It was undoubtedly anticipatory and ahead of its time, for
there was no law at that time under which such a declaration might be
made.
E. The Law of Enterprise Bankruptcy of 1986
The national Law of Enterprise Bankruptcy ("Bankruptcy Law")
was approved on December 2, 1986. It was to apply only to state en-
terprises with separate legal personality. It was a quite remarkable
law for many reasons, particularly because it commenced life in a vac-
uum. It lacked a legal subject. The substantive legal reform of the
state enterprise sector (which would eventually accord a state enter-
prise the status of a separate legal personality) was still two years off.
Until it was enacted, the Bankruptcy Law was of academic curiosity
only. For this reason, the Bankruptcy Law did not operate until three
months after the law on state-owned enterprises became effective.
That law was not approved until April 13, 1988. It was implemented
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on August 1, 1988. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Law did not became
effective until November 1, 1988.
F. Informal Merger Procedures of 1989
Although it falls short of a law, another reference to bankruptcy
appeared when some tentative "Procedures" regarding "enterprise
merger" were informally issued in February 1989 on the initiative of
four central government agencies. These "Procedures," which did not
have the force of law, envisaged circumstances in which an enterprise
"on the verge of bankruptcy might be merged" with another. To en-
courage such mergers, the People's Bank of China and the State Eco-
nomic Commission promoted the possibility of deferring, reducing, or
even canceling interest on the outstanding loans of such enterprises to
banks.
G. The Code of Civil Procedure Law of 1991
On April 9, 1991 the Civil Procedure Law was approved. It con-
tains a specific chapter (Chapter 19) on bankruptcy of legal person
enterprises. The chapter, however, is comprised of only seven short
articles. It applies to "an enterprise with legal person status." The law
permits application for a declaration of bankruptcy if, "due to serious
losses," such an enterprise "is unable to settle mature debts." It ex-
pressly does not apply to "enterprises owned by the whole people"
(state enterprises) because, presumably, only the Bankruptcy Law
would apply to these. Some state enterprises, however, have subse-
quently been converted into companies with varying degrees of state
ownership. This raises the issue of whether the Civil Procedure Law
or the Bankruptcy Law should govern the insolvency of such an
enterprise.
H. People's Supreme Court Opinion of 1991
On November 7, 1991 the People's Supreme Court published an
opinion on the operation of the Bankruptcy Law. It was concerned
primarily with procedural rules in relation to that law. By then it had
been recognized that the "skeleton" nature of the Bankruptcy Law
required some considerable detail regarding practice and procedure.
The "opinion" sought to provide this detail.
In addition, the opinion provided some matters of substance. The
most important concerned the troublesome definition of insolvency in
Article 3 of the Bankruptcy Law. It read:
Article 3. Enterprises which have incurred serious losses due to
poor management and administration and are unable to discharge
matured liabilities will declare bankruptcy in accordance with the
provisions of this Law.
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The opinion of the People's Supreme Court stated that an inability to
discharge matured liabilities meant that the time for discharge or pay-
ment of such debt (or debts) had expired, a creditor had demanded
payment; and/or (it is not clear which) the debtor was obviously defi-
cient in liquidity. The opinion thus sought to state that Article 3 was
capable of being read or interpreted as providing for alternative tests
of insolvency, including the "cashflow" test.
I. Regulations in Special Economic Zones
As part of its "open door" economic policy, China marked out a
number of "special economic zones." These areas each have their
own local congress and, within limits, are permitted to enact their own
regulatory laws. The laws apply only with the special zone. Regula-
tions concerning bankruptcy were made for the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone on November 10, 1993.
The 1993 Shenzhen Bankruptcy Rules contain a number of impor-
tant features. First, access to the bankruptcy procedures is premised
on the debtor enterprise being "unable to discharge debt which has
fallen due" (Article 3). This rule is a clear "cashflow" test and is in
considerable contrast to the vague concept of insolvency contained in
the Bankruptcy Law.' Secondly, these regulations provide for "concil-
iation." This is, in effect, a provision for a "composition" of debts,
either in terms of extended time for payment, a reduction in debt, or a
combination of the two. This somewhat mirrors the provisions for
conciliation or compromise contained in the 1906 and 1935 bank-
ruptcy laws. Thirdly, if a state enterprise is the debtor and it seeks
reorganization, the provisions of the Law of Enterprise Bankruptcy
are applicable. Finally, the rules provide for the appointment of a
"Liquidation Committee" (Article 45) and for a "Conciliation Super-
visory Group" (Article 30). It is notable that accountants and lawyers
may be members of the liquidation committee or supervisory group.
J. Company Law 1993
Article 189 of the Company Law, approved in December 1993 and
operative July 1, 1994, makes a fleeting reference to "bankruptcy
law." This Article provides for the appointment of a special liquida-
tion committee for an insolvent company which has been declared
bankrupt. The special liquidation committee may apply to have the
company declared bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Law. This is odd
1. Curiously, in Article five of the rules of Guangdong province on company
bankruptcy, which were enacted in May 1993, before the Shenzhen rules, insolvency
occurs when "the total assets of the debtor are insufficient to discharge its matured
liabilities." This is a "balance sheet" insolvency test. It is curious because Shenzhen
Economic Zone is located in Guangdong province.
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because the Bankruptcy Law is supposed to only apply to state
enterprises.
K. State Council Directive 1994
On October 25, 1994 the State Council issued a "notice" regarding
certain practices for carrying out the Bankruptcy Law, known as
"Document Number 59." This notice is concerned primarily with the
position of employees of an insolvent state enterprise. It was no
doubt a political statement, for it requires that the first priority in a
case of enterprise bankruptcy is to "resettle the employees in order to
maintain order and stability in the society."
Additionally, Document Number 59 requires that any land use
rights of the enterprise (private ownership of land, even by a state
enterprise, is not permitted in China-instead both public and private
enterprises are given a right to use land, although they "own" any
buildings on the land) be sold and proceeds from the sale be used to
fund the resettlement of the employees. Any surplus proceeds from
the sale of land use rights can then be applied to pay off creditors, but
if proceeds from the disposal of the land use right are insufficient to
care for the employees, then any deficiency can be covered by pro-
ceeds from the sale of other assets.
Document Number 59 requires the relevant local government to
take appropriate measures for the retraining of employees, endeavor-
ing to obtain other work for them and providing them with a basic
living allowance in the meantime. To encourage a sense of worker
responsibility for his or her future, Document Number 59 tacitly au-
thorizes the payment of lump sums to employees (calculated on the
basis of three times the annual income for the last year of employ-
ment) which might be used by the employee to fund his or her own
livelihood. This grant would, in turn, relieve the government of an
obligation to support them.
The notice also provides that housing, schools, nurseries, hospitals,
and other welfare facilities of the bankrupt enterprise will no longer
be the property of the bankrupt enterprise, but rather will be adminis-
tered by the relevant government department. Finally, it requires
greater emphasis be given to reorganization, including the formation
of a working department to "organise, regulate and solve problems
encountered during the implementation of the bankruptcy law."
L. The Commercial Bank Law of 1995
A further bankruptcy provision appears in the Commercial Bank
Law, approved in May 1995. Article 71 of the law provides that if a
commercial bank cannot meet its debts it may be declared bankrupt
by the People's Court. It then articulates a procedure for liquidation
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of the bank. It does not link the procedure to either the Bankruptcy
Law, the Civil Procedure Law, or the Company Law.
M. The Security Law of 1995
This important law deals with the legal requirements, rights, and
obligations concerning security (mortgages, pledges, liens) over prop-
erty and guarantees of debt. It was approved on June 30, 1995 and
became effective on October 1, 1995. It makes only one reference to
bankruptcy, however, by providing that if a debtor becomes bankrupt,
a guarantor may only participate in the bankruptcy proceeding if the
creditor fails to enforce claims.
N. Other Miscellaneous Laws
The law on Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Enterprises (July 1979) is si-
lent about bankruptcy, although it mentions termination of a "joint
enterprise incurring heavy losses" (Article 13).
The law on Sole Foreign Investment Enterprises (April 1986) is also
silent on insolvency, although it talks of "liquidation carried out in
accordance with legally stipulated procedures" if the enterprise is ter-
minated (Article 21).
The Chinese law on Sino-Foreign Co-Operative Enterprises (April
1988) is also silent on the issue of bankruptcy, although it mentions
"liquidating" a co-operative enterprise upon termination.
There are also bankruptcy regulations in Shanghai (August 1991),
Beijing (June 1992), and some other cities that primarily apply to legal
person enterprises with foreign participation or ownership. These reg-
ulations provide for a form of solvent liquidation and, in a case where
liabilities exceed assets, for a form of "special liquidation." A case of
special liquidation can be converted to a bankruptcy under the Code
of Civil Procedure.
II. AssESSMENT OF THE ExIsTING BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
Thus exposed, the existing Chinese bankruptcy system emerges as
one with several features: a primary law, the Law of Enterprise Bank-
ruptcy, which is directed only at the state enterprise sector; opinions
and policy documents that seek to direct and regulate the application
of this law; a minor law, the Code of Civil Procedure, directed at most
other forms of legal person; and a number of other laws and regula-
tions, most of which are confined to special types of legal person and
some of which have a limited geographical application.
There is a clear need for consolidation of this quilt of laws, regula-
tions, and directives. The existing system is too diverse. It is a largely
unconnected system that breeds complication and conflict. True, it is
of recent origin and proper account must be taken of China's need to
establish some threshold regulation in this area. While faults attribu-
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table to the comparative youth of the law can be excused, the diversity
cannot.
Viewed from an economic perspective, it may fairly be said that
many of these laws, particularly the 1986 Bankruptcy Law, were
designed only to meet the conditions of the then emerging planned
market economy. Criticisms of the principal and other laws some ten
years later should be tempered accordingly. But there can be no
doubt that the passage of those years has resulted in substantial
change to, and a continued transformation of, the Chinese economy.
A number of economic indicia evidence that change and transfor-
mation. First, in sheer numbers it is estimated that there are now
more private enterprises (including those with collective ownership)
than state enterprises in China. And while the state enterprise sector
may still predominate in terms of production and contribution of taxes
and the like to the fiscal economy, the very presence of such a large
number of private enterprises (and the almost certain prospect that
their number will continue to grow) requires that there be a more
adequate law than the existing brief chapter in the Civil Procedure
Law to deal with the inevitable increase in the number of private en-
terprise insolvencies. Second, the market created by the economic re-
forms in China has become increasingly competitive. This has and will
continue to impact very significantly on the state enterprise sector. It
will also impact on other enterprise sectors. Third, there has been a
significant increase in foreign investment in China and a proliferation
of "sino/foreign" joint venture enterprises. It is essential that foreign
investment be both encouraged and protected. When an enterprise in
which foreign investment has been made becomes insolvent, it is nec-
essary to have an adequate law to deal with the problem. Fourth, pro-
duction levels have substantially increased in China as a result of the
economic activity in enterprises of all descriptions.
So, while it may still be correct to describe the Chinese economy as
one which is in transition, the extent of development and transition
has been such that there is a need for a bankruptcy law system that is
better equipped to reflect that transition and the changes that have
occurred because of it.
III. PARTICULAR DEFICIENCIES OF THE ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY
IN RELATION TO STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
The law that governs the insolvency of state owned enterprises, the
only substantive bankruptcy law in China, had a controversial begin-
ning. At the time of its enactment, there was a strongly held view that
a state enterprise, no matter how constructed or administered, is but
an agency or branch of the state. Therefore, under this view, the state
would be obligated to ensure that all the debts and liabilities of a state
enterprise are met in full. Hence, a state enterprise could not, and
should not, become bankrupt. Its existence might be terminated by
2574 [Vol. 64
CHINESE BANKRUPTCY REFORM
the state, for whatever reason, but the state must meet its outstanding
obligations. Accordingly, the possibility of bankruptcy for a state en-
terprise should not even be remotely suggested. This view may still
exist in the Chinese community. Practically, however, state enter-
prises have increasingly been exposed to the competition of a market
economy. If that economy is truly to be competitive, state enterprises
should be subject to the same market rules as other participants. One
of those rules is that insolvent traders should not be permitted to con-
tinue to participate in the market.
At this time, there was also a distinct lack of confidence in the law.
The law's title included the words "for trial implementation." Imple-
menting a law on a trial basis is a unique occurrence in Chinese legis-
lative history. Further, the vague and uninformative manner in which
the law is written suggests a lack of knowledge, experience, and severe
doubt about the law's application. Despite its troubled inception, the
bankruptcy law has been employed to declare state enterprises bank-
rupt. That it has worked at all must seem remarkable to some. The
basic issue of whether there should be such a law, however, should not
continue to be overshadowed by the controversial and doubtful begin-
nings of this particular law. That aside, there are a number of reasons
which explain why it has had problems. The problems may be
grouped together, as follows:
" Internal Defects. These are quite major. It is a very short and
very general bankruptcy law. The key definition of "insolvency"
is unclear, vague, and open to disagreement. On its face, it re-
quires proof of "bad management and the incurring of heavy
losses" leading to an inability "to discharge matured liabilities"
(although this has since been clarified by the People's Supreme
Court Opinion of 1991). The procedures are not sufficiently de-
tailed. The powers and functions of the creditors are extremely
limited. There are no adequate provisions in relation to bank-
ruptcy offenses.
" Absence of Restructuring/Reorganization Techniques. The Law
does not emphasize restructuring or reorganization and provides
no protective measures to encourage those techniques (there are
only six articles that deal with reorganization in the law). Rather,
it is heavily centered on liquidation.
" Failure to Address Worker Unemployment. Apart from a procla-
mation in Article 4 that the State should bear the responsibility
for workers who become unemployed because of enterprise insol-
vency, the law fails to deal with the known and seriously apparent
social welfare consequences that are destined to emerge.
" Government and Judicial Roles. On its face, the law provides for
a judicial mechanism to administer the law. It also provides (in
Article 8), however, for the bureaucracy of government to have a
role in the law by requiring government approval before a state
enterprise may take steps under the law. This, as will be seen,
introduces an element of considerable complexity. The judicial
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mechanism becomes subservient to the involvement of govern-
ment administration.
IV. PARTICULAR FACTORS INHIBITING BANKRUPTCY LAW
REFORM IN THE STATE ENTERPRISE AREA
Thus far, it has been suggested that there are three major reasons
why a new bankruptcy law is required. These reasons are:
* the diverse and largely disconnected existing bankruptcy law
system;
* the changes in, and development of, economic conditions and pol-
icy; and
* the particular deficiencies of the primary Bankruptcy Law and its
attendant regulations.
The next issue concerns the possible application of a new law to state
enterprises. In this section, ignoring the internal deficiencies of the
existing law, an endeavor is made to identify and assess the major ob-
stacles in applying any traditional/contemporary bankruptcy law, no
matter its composition or quality, to the state enterprise sector.
A. General Reform in the State Enterprise Sector
The reform process in the state enterprise sector began in earnest in
1984 with a regulation on "ten points of autonomy." Reformers have
sought to lessen the differentiation between the state enterprise sector
and the private sector and to further expose the state enterprise sector
to the competitive forces of a market economy. For enterprises which
have a sound financial base, a good performance record, and good
management, this exposure does not present any great problem. The
real problem lies, however, in state enterprises (particularly the me-
dium and small size) which struggle to survive in the unprotected envi-
ronment of a market economy. Particular problems that these
enterprises have include excess employees, social welfare burdens, a
high adverse asset to liability ratio (estimated to be at least 75% and
possibly much higher within many enterprises), obsolete equipment,
non-existent marketing and research and development, backward
technology, out of date products or products for which there is no
market, artificially high price structure for products, poor manage-
ment, and inefficiency. Some of these enterprises have been subjected
to the existing bankruptcy law. A small number of them have been
liquidated; a few have been merged; and others have been "recreated"
through an informal transfer of assets procedure. Although the extent
of state enterprise insolvency appears from the figures to be geared to
the health of the economy (evidenced by some initial economic "heat"
of 1988 and 1989, a slowdown in the economy and a rectification pro-
cess between 1989 and 1991, and the relative surge of numbers of in-
solvent enterprises following the "opening up" speeches of Deng
2576 [Vol. 64
CHINESE BANKRUPTCY REFORM
Xiaopeng in 1992), the number of enterprises that have been sub-
jected to the bankruptcy law is surprisingly small, given the known
financial and other difficulties under which many of them operate.
The small number of state enterprise bankruptcies implies that be-
cause of various related problems (such as unemployment, the extent
of enterprise debt owed to the banking sector, and the extent of debt
between enterprises) bankruptcy in the state enterprise sector has
been subject to government intervention and control. There are two
aspects to this intervention. First, on a macro scale, because the econ-
omy has been tightly controlled. The usual forces of a typical market
economy have not been allowed free reign. If they had, there would
undoubtedly have been a much larger number of state enterprise
bankruptcies. Second, as a result of these broad market controls, local
industry, commercial bureaus, and local government departments
have similarly exerted influence over state enterprises. This has often
resulted in strong enterprises being required to take over hopeless,
struggling, and insolvent smaller enterprises (which should have been
declared bankrupt), often at considerable cost to, and adverse effect
upon, the stronger enterprise.
None of this should come as any surprise. A socialist market econ-
omy is being developed in China. Emphasis is placed on promoting
and maintaining public ownership in all areas of production. This is
achieved and consolidated through both state-owned and collective
enterprise sectors. Because government has much at stake within
these sectors, government regulation of those sectors necessarily
follows.
An inevitable conflict arises from this. On one hand there is a
strong desire to see a bankruptcy law promoted and to have it recog-
nized as an integral part of a market economy that deals with these
casualties in a civilized manner. On the other hand, there is a need for
government intervention. This conflict results in manipulation not
only to the extent to which a bankruptcy law might have to operate
but, also, as will now be seen, the manner in which it operates in the
state enterprise sector.
B. The Government Control Factor
Reforms in the state enterprise sector have established a state en-
terprise as a separate legal entity. Many state enterprises have been
corporatized. A state enterprise and its management have clear lines
of autonomy in operating and managing the enterprise. All of this is
consistent with the aim of making the state enterprise part of the mar-
ket society. It also forces the individual enterprise to regulate its af-
fairs accordingly and holds the management of an enterprise
responsible for its performance and survival. Despite these reforms,
government approval is still required to terminate, declare bankrupt,
merge, or reorganize the enterprise.
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Dealing with insolvent state enterprises under the existing bank-
ruptcy law entails an extensive amount of government involvement,
particularly at the local government level. It is impossible for an en-
terprise to submit to bankruptcy (or for any creditor of an insolvent
enterprise to file an application for bankruptcy and have that applica-
tion duly processed through the judicial system) unless the enterprise
has been cleared or licensed to do so by a number of government
departments and agencies.
This, of course, illustrates the great dividing line between the state
enterprise and private enterprise sectors. Government approval is re-
quired if a state enterprise is to become subject to the bankruptcy law.
This is consistent with the earlier observation that the government
regulates the extent of enterprise bankruptcy.
Again, this is understandable because the government has much at
stake in the state enterprise sector. It is the government's responsibil-
ity to be concerned about the fate and position of workers of an insol-
vent state enterprise. The government must protect the public
ownership of state enterprises because the people are the ultimate
owners of the worth of the enterprise. Although this is consistent with
the "socialist market economy" road along which China has been
traveling, however, it underscores the inevitable conflict between a
socialist and market economy.
Unfortunately, the socialist market economy prevents equal in-
volvement of all sectors in the market economy. If an enterprise can-
not be declared bankrupt, even on the application of a legitimate and
deserving creditor, unless the government consents or approves, an
element of control is exercised which would not occur in the private
sector. One effect of this is to shelter state enterprises from the nor-
mal forces that act upon the private sector in a market economy.
The other problem with the government control is that it requires
the involvement of a number of government departments and agen-
cies. In addition to the usual difficulties associated with multiple deci-
sion makers, it also results, in many cases, in a lengthy decision-
making process. An insolvency law that is proactive cannot be ex-
pected to provide benefits unless the process is permitted to operate
quickly and efficiently, before the financial difficulties become acute
and critical.
C. Irrecoverable Debt and the Banking Sector
The next area of inhibition to insolvency law reform comes from a
combination of what might best be termed "old debt" and the Chinese
commercial banking sector. Traditional "financing" of the needs of
the state enterprises originally came from the government in the form
of direct funding. This was, in effect, a contribution of capital or eq-
uity from the nominal owner of the enterprise. Some years ago, a
change in policy was fashioned. Direct government funding of state
2578 [Vol. 64
CHINESE BANKRUPTCY REFORM
enterprises ceased and state enterprises were forced to seek their fi-
nancial requirements from the commercial banking sector.
Thus, commercial banks became instruments of economic change
and reform in the state enterprise sector along the lines of "user
pays." The intention and the logic may have been sound, but not the
results. The banks were used, in essence, as "policy" banks. They
were required, by central or local government, to fund the require-
ments of the state enterprise sector (sometimes on an industry basis)
under policies dictated by those same authorities. Consequently, com-
mercial banks made many loans to the state enterprise sector that ag-
gregated in substantial sums.
Although these loans were made on "commercial" terms, in that
interest was payable on them, they were far from being commercial.
Although the nominal lending rate was around ten percent, the real
rate, at most times since 1990 has been a negative rate caused by the
upward curve of inflation which, at least for the past three years, has
run at a higher rate than the nominal rate of interest. This has meant
that the "return," even from performing loans, has been less than
profitable to the banks. When the loans become nonperforming (such
that the enterprise cannot pay even the nominal interest), the loss to
the banks is significant.
Worse problems follow when it becomes apparent that many enter-
prises will never be able to repay the principal of the loans, or even a
part of them. A considerable proportion of the loans were made in
pursuit of policies or initiatives that have either missed the mark or
were wrong. Many loans were made in a highly protected set of mar-
ket conditions that have since evaporated. They were poorly assessed,
if at all, and they were highly subsidized.
The balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of some of these
banks are now affected as a result of their policy loan funding. This
raises two major problems. The first is that the banks oppose bank-
ruptcy or liquidation of an enterprise because the loan then will be-
come plainly irrecoverable and must be written off in time. The
irrecoverability of the loan becomes certain in a case of liquidation.
As an adjunct to that, the banks will rarely, if ever, become the prime
force in directing an enterprise into bankruptcy, even though the
banks are as aware as the enterprise that the loan is nonperforming
and the enterprise cannot now and probably will never be able to pay,
in many cases, even part of it. The banks also become unwilling and
sometimes strongly adverse participants in reorganization or compro-
mise proposals because, again, they know they will face an inevitable
write-off of debt which will follow from a reorganization or
compromise.
Although the banks are by far the major creditors of these enter-
prises, they cannot solely be blamed for their essentially negative and,
at times, critical attitude toward the application of the Bankruptcy
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Law. Although their balance sheets are affected, the application of
any insolvency law under those conditions is made that much more
difficult and strained.
The second problem that arises is that there is nothing that an insol-
vency law can do to change this problem. It is a problem that the
central government and central bank will have to deal with through
appropriate measures. The observation must be made, however, that
this is a festering problem that will not go away. If it is not dealt with
soon it will be carried over to the advent of a new bankruptcy law and
it will become infected by the same problem from the beginning. But
what of the future? Will this scenario continue?
It is encouraging that earlier this year steps were taken to reform
the Chinese banking system. Relevant to this discussion is the new
Commercial Banking Law (effective July 1, 1995) and other measures
seeking to achieve the following results:
" to establish (or re-establish) the effectiveness of commercial
banks and to remove them from any connection with policy
funding;
" to establish three new policy banks in place of the commercial
banks;
• to draw a clear line of demarcation between the newly reformed
commercial banks and the new policy banks (in particular, the
banking law provides that the commercial banks are required to
make only commercial loans; all policy funding will be the prov-
ince of the new policy banks; and none of the commercial banks
can be directed or required to make policy loans or funding, no
matter at whose request or direction);
" to require the commercial banks to employ an appropriate system
for assessment of loan applications, particularly, no doubt, those
involving state enterprises, before a loan is granted. Hopefully
this will result in the commercial banks requesting information
and determining loan applications by reference to quality criteria
such as financial position, profitability, performance, manage-
ment, purpose of loan, projections, monitoring, and so forth.
This, of course, will depend on the ability of commercial banks to
exercise and discharge that obligation and responsibility. The
new law should also require enterprises to produce authenticated
financial and other relevant information that is reliable and
complete.
If all this occurs, the existing problem of nonperforming loans, subsi-
dized interest rates, and government influence and control will greatly
lessen. The resulting situation should contrast markedly with a previ-
ously weak and pliable commercial bank sector. Thus, although there
is a full and proper reckoning yet to be made of the position that has
been reached in respect of past practices, for the future there are suffi-
cient signs to indicate greater stability and a more open and competi-
tive market for loan funding. The market should develop in two
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ways-a supply market amongst the banks themselves (particularly if
they are faced with competition from other domestic and foreign
banks) and a consumption market, particularly within the state enter-
prise sector, such that only those with proven past and future financial
and performance records will be able to borrow on competitive and
commercial terms. This will also help to strengthen the need for ade-
quate financial and accounting systems and records within the state
enterprise sector.
D. Social Welfare
This quite extensive problem is largely confined to the state enter-
prise sector. It seriously impacts on the application of an insolvency
law to that sector. Simply stated, substantial unemployment would
result if the state enterprise sector were subjected to the rigorous ap-
plication of an insolvency law regime. It is neither politically nor so-
cially desirable to treat the prospect of extensive unemployment
arising from the insolvency of state enterprises as simply the necessary
or inevitable product of a transition process towards a market
economy.
Within the state enterprise sector the biggest problem is the absence
of a sufficiently established and funded social insurance scheme. If
one of the major effects of the application of market forces to the
state enterprise sector is that many of them will not survive, the result
must be unemployment for many people and inadequate provision for
the retired. This result leads to the responsibility and obligation to
retrain the unemployed, resettle them in suitable work positions, pro-
vide for retired and the aged and those suffering from permanent and
temporary work disabilities, and to provide health care and so forth.
Other social obligations for which SOE's have been responsible, at
least from the mid-1960s, and which may yet emerge as major
problems in themselves, include housing, education, transportation,
subsidized food, and other benefits.
Until a well established and adequately funded social insurance sys-
tem is the reality, insolvent state enterprises will continue to bear the
massive burden of employee "settlement" and monetary assistance.
But it will be a considerable period of time before the state enterprise
sector can fairly be said to have been relieved from those and other
burdens. So the question is what is to be done in the meantime?
The problem is exacerbated by well or moderately performing state
enterprises having to continue to employ workers who are, in reality,
unnecessary, to continue their obligations for the support of the re-
tired, and to maintain other employee benefits. These burdens affect
profit and loss and have an impact on balance sheets. A state enter-
prise, thrust into the demands and pursuits of a commercial market
economy, is ill-equipped to bear the burdens. The argument that
these burdens are "evened out" because of the comparatively lower
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wages that have been, and continue to be, paid to state enterprise em-
ployees in return for these extra benefits is no longer relevant. Hid-
den but nevertheless factual redundancy is severely affecting the state
owned enterprise sector.
The present "methodology" for dealing with the problem of unem-
ployed workers of an insolvent state enterprise largely follows the dic-
tates of State Council Document Number 59, mentioned earlier. The
real crux of the problem, in a bankruptcy situation, is that the man-
dates of State Council Document Number 59 have been interpreted as
meaning that unless and until a settlement plan in respect to workers
of a putative bankrupt enterprise has been agreed upon and deter-
mined to be in accordance with the guidelines in that policy, the enter-
prise is not eligible to apply for bankruptcy. This is the main reason
for the previously mentioned requirement for government "approval"
or "license" before an enterprise can volunteer for bankruptcy under
the existing law.
Two results follow from this. First, a considerable amount of time
elapses before such a settlement plan can be fashioned and approved.
Another, and probably more damaging, result is that if a settlement
plan cannot be made (often because there are simply no assets to en-
able a settlement plan to be formulated), bankruptcy is not considered
to be a suitable solution and so the enterprise is left without any reso-
lution. Both of these factors impact the workers and create uncer-
tainty, insecurity, and general workforce instability.
Of course, the answers to these difficulties lie outside the applica-
tion of an insolvency law. They may only be resolved, in the long
term, by the provision of a full social insurance system. In the short
term there is no real solution. The existing scheme that requires land
use rights be devoted exclusively to worker settlement appears to be
the only viable short term method. This solution should not be lim-
ited to the short term method and the practice of supplementing any
deficiency out of other enterprise assets for worker settlement should
cease.
E. The Domino Effect Factor of Triangular Debt
There is a considerable amount of debt owed between different
state enterprises. This is because they have traditionally traded on
credit within their fraternity and, in more recent years, because of
their inability to raise finance, have resorted to credit among them-
selves for survival. The result is an extensive amount of debt and
credit between enterprises. Little of the debt and credit is common or
"mutual" between the same enterprises, thus creating the "triangular"
nature of the problem. This produces a fear of a "domino" effect,
namely that the bankruptcy of one enterprise might, because of debits
and credits, lead to the bankruptcy of a number of other enterprises.
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A bankruptcy law is incapable of solving this problem. Although a
bankruptcy law should contain the usual type of provision permitting
"set off" of mutual debt and credit between a bankrupt enterprise and
debtors or creditors of the enterprise, it is not applicable in the cir-
cumstance of triangular debt because there is generally no mutuality
between the parties involved.
F. Assessment
The overall assessment of the five problems mentioned in this part
suggests that there are distinct problems in the employment of a tradi-
tional insolvency law in the adverse conditions that these factors pro-
duce. In particular, the overhang of bank debt, the social welfare
issues, and the triangular debt problem has produced a systemic diffi-
culty of considerable magnitude. No reform of the insolvency law will
cure or provide a solution to these difficulties.
Indeed, it may strongly be argued that the use of a bankruptcy law
to deal with enterprises under these conditions is wasteful because re-
sources are expended throughout many areas of government to ago-
nize over the fate of these types of enterprises. Moreover, under the
existing bankruptcy law, if there is no ready and apparent convenient
solution (particularly to the problem of worker settlement), more
often than not, nothing is done for a considerable period of time.
This, of course, only aggravates the existing problems. If, for example,
there are outstanding loans which are impossible to repay, interest
continues to be debited and the liabilities of the enterprise simply
swell. At the same time, assets of the enterprise (particularly assets
such as inventory, raw materials, and debtors) either dissipate in value
or are regarded as lost. Thus, the financial position of the enterprise
deteriorates because of the inability of decision makers to perform
promptly the task that is required. This results in a wasting of assets,
an increase in liabilities and, ultimately, a worse result.
It may also be submitted that it is unnecessary to deal with these
enterprises by the application of a bankruptcy law and that many of
them are best suited by a pure liquidation or merger process. It
strains credibility to apply those processes through a bankruptcy law
that features a judicial mechanism at its center. These enterprises may
better be dealt with under an entirely separated administrative law
even though it may mirror some aspects of bankruptcy. It may be
submitted that precedent exists for this in both India and Germany.
G. The Possibility of an Administrative "Insolvency" Law
Like many countries, India inherited much of its basic law from
England. The treatment of insolvent companies in India has largely
been dealt with under the 1955 Companies Act of India, which was
modeled on the English company legislation of 1948. There has been
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little or no change to it. Yet, early in the 1980s it was recognized in
India that laws like this were not meant, and were not able, to deal
with the systemic problems of financial disability, particularly in the
industrial sector. In the absence of anything else, enterprises in finan-
cial difficulty struggled until they were eventually forced to cease pro-
duction, close business, and be liquidated. In the industrial sector of
India, this had a number of repercussions. It could have led to a
shortage of supplies in important or critical economic areas, had a
concertina effect on other enterprises, and led to extensive unemploy-
ment. None of this should appear as anything remarkable, for these
type of 'flow on' effects of insolvency are now well recognized. It is
remarkable, however, that this was the subject of much public concern
in India at a time when some of these economic dimensions, although
known, were only barely recognized in more fully developed econo-
mies. In 1981, the Reserve Bank of India appointed a special commit-
tee (it became known as the Tiwari Committee, after the name of its
chairman) to examine the difficulties encountered in the rehabilitation
of enterprises in financial difficulty and to suggest remedial measures,
including changes in the law.
The work of the committee was largely focused on industrial enter-
prises whose financial affairs might be (and were) aptly described, as
"sick." The definition adopted for such a "sick" industrial enterprise
was one that had incurred losses in consecutive years and whose asset
to liability ratio had deteriorated to below a minimum nominal stan-
dard of one to one.
In its report, the committee correctly observed that special legisla-
tion was needed to enable speedy and effective action to be taken to
rehabilitate "sick units" by creating a specialized body devoted to
their revitalization. The special committee subsequently recom-
mended such action.
As a result, in 1985, the Sick Industrial (Companies Special Provi-
sions) Act was enacted. Under that legislation, a Board for Industrial
and Financial Reconstruction was established and given powerful ad-
ministrative powers. The Act mandated that a "sick" company report
its condition to the Board within sixty days of finalizing its audited
accounts. In addition, a financial institution to which such a company
was indebted had the power to make a report to the Board.
The Board was required to conduct an inquiry into the financial
position of a reported company and determine whether the company
might, within a reasonable time, recover or whether a scheme of reha-
bilitation should be proposed. Once a company was reported, a "mor-
atorium" took effect, preventing the institution of civil proceedings or




The economic purpose of the legislation was made clear in the case
of Navanit R. Kamani v RR Kamani.2 The court observed that the
primary purpose of the special legislation was "to promote a speedy
and efficient machinery so that a sick industry could be revived with
utmost expedition, production could be started, locked up funds could
be utilized for furthering socio-economic development." This, to-
gether with the 'regulatory' nature of the legislation, suggests that it
was very much in conformity with a somewhat interventionist eco-
nomic approach (Fabian socialism is one description that has been ap-
plied), of the Indian government. It also suggests that this branch of
Indian insolvency law was very much "pro-debtor," another way to
judge the economic influences that tend to shape an insolvency law.
Although this legislation was initially enacted with reference to the
private sector, it was amended in December 1991 to enable public sec-
tor enterprises to be referred to the Board. Under the amendment, it
became compulsory for a public sector enterprise to report its position
to the Board once the minimum standard asset to liability ratio was
triggered.
It appears that the Board has been reasonably active and successful
in rehabilitating public sector enterprises. This success has more
likely been the result of the establishment of a special fund in Febru-
ary 1992, helped by a $300 million loan from the World Bank, to assist
with the problems of redundant employees in these enterprises. The
fund has been used by the Board to promote early retirement and
retraining schemes for redundant and displaced workers from the sick
state enterprises.
At the central level, some fifty-five sick central enterprises had been
referred to the Board by the end of 1994. They had aggregate accu-
mulated losses of $3 billion U.S. dollars and over 250,000 employees.
The special fund was used to pay off about 25% of these employees
with early retirement schemes. Some of the enterprises were then
fully restored to profitability, but the prospect of restoring many of
them has been difficult. Despite the prescription to report a "sick"
financial position, many of them did not publish accounts and were
terminally ill before the Board became involved. The result has often
been the write-off of government investment and/or loan funding in
the enterprise to enable it to start afresh.
Despite these failures, the legislation is regarded as effective be-
cause it does expose, in a public way, under-performing state sector
enterprises and ensures that the administrative law is applied.
The institution of the Regulatory Board in India might be compared
to the policies and processes that were quickly developed to deal with
the financially troubled state enterprise sector of the former East Ger-
many, immediately prior to and following the reunification of Ger-
2. A.I.R. 1989 SC 9.
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many. Enterprises that were in a hopeless financial and production
position were subjected to a concentrated, nonjudicial, administration
that had only one aim-the possible conglomeration of a number of
enterprises and the termination and disposal of the remainder as
quickly and efficiently as possible.
This goal was achieved through specific legislation enacted in 1990
that set out the policies to be adopted. A powerful specialized admin-
istrative body (the Treuhandanstalt) was established to give effect to
the legislation and its policies.
The main responsibility of the Treuhandanstalt was to restructure
state enterprises and either sell (privatize), merge, conglomerate, or
liquidate them if restructuring and privatization did not appear
possible.
The restructuring and privatization process followed this pattern:
* the first step was to incorporate all state enterprises by transform-
ing them into companies in which the Treuhandanstalt was the
sole shareholder. The Treuhandanstalt then installed supervisory
boards of directors to each enterprise that reorganized the man-
agement structure. In addition, legal ownership of assets was
transferred to the newly formed companies;
* the second step was to provide some limited temporary financial
restructuring. About seventy percent of state enterprises re-
quired this temporary financial assistance. The techniques em-
ployed by the Treuhandanstalt included assuming continued
interest liability on all debts, imposing a short term moratorium
on old debt repayment, and making available new bank loans that
were guaranteed by the Treuhandanstalt to give the enterprises
much needed liquidity;
* the third step was to rewrite the balance sheets in accordance
with standard international accounting requirements so they re-
flected true and reliable values of assets and liabilities, and ex-
posed any economic weaknesses or risks of the enterprise;
" the fourth step was to require business plans from the enterprises
that helped to facilitate further loans and to identify loss-making
units within the enterprise which were then closed down;
* the fifth step was to recapitalize the enterprises. The recapitaliza-
tion did not require the injection of fresh capital, but was accom-
plished by the Treuhandanstalt assuming liability for old debt;
" the sixth step was to breakdown enterprises which comprised a
number of different production units. As a result more than 5000
new enterprises were created;
" the final step was to require the sale of excess or unused assets
under the supervision of the Treuhandanstalt.
The process was, of course, inhibited by the need to reduce the excess
workforces that were characteristic of the state enterprise system of
the former East Germany. Among other things, this reduction re-
quired intensive job creation programs. Thus refreshed, the newly
formed companies became marketable and were sold. All together
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some 14,500 enterprises have been privatized, either through partial
privatization of a going concern business (about 50%), outright sale
(about 30%), or partial sale.
For enterprises that could not immediately be restructured and
privatized by the above techniques, three alternatives existed. These
were:
" for enterprises whose privatization might still be a longer term
possibility, a "management holding company" was created that
resulted in enterprises being variously grouped under the one
holding. A manager was appointed to manage the group and to
determine a possible restructuring process and sale;
• the second alternative was "liquidation" or divestiture. This op-
tion required the gradual and orderly disposal of assets of the af-
fected enterprises and, in most cases, a "consultative bargaining"
process with creditors to reduce their claims, but not as low as
that which might be paid if the enterprise was made bankrupt. In
this "liquidation" process, the debts, whether reduced or not, had
to be paid in full. This was, in effect, a state administrative pro-
cess, no doubt costly for the state but arguably providing in the
long term some social and economic benefits and a better result,
than bankruptcy;
" the third alternative was bankruptcy under the relevant law
through the judicial process. This appears to have been a "last
resort" option in the East German experiment.
As at the end of 1994, approximately 3500 enterprises were in liquida-
tion or bankruptcy with some ninety percent being liquidated and only
ten percent in bankruptcy. This demonstrates the predominate use of
the liquidation administrative process by the Treuhandanstalt.
The advantages of such an administrative procedure or technique of
"liquidation" are the continuation of the enterprises until, hopefully,
sold; some employment can be maintained and preserved; asset sales
can be better managed through the government agency (in this case
the Treuhandanstalt); and more general economic (both macro and
micro) control is possible. On the other hand, there is a significant
cost involved with the administrative procedure because of the need
to continue servicing the existing debt and to maintain the assets (in-
cluding a business) in an adequate state for sale or transfer.
A final observation should be made on the record of the work of
the Treuhandanstalt with respect to employment. In 1991, there were
approximately three million employees in state enterprises that were
undergoing restructure, liquidation, or both. At the end of 1994, ap-
proximately fifty percent of these were enjoying continued employ-
ment in privatized firms; about seventeen percent were unemployed;
about twenty-seven percent had been retired; and the remaining six
percent were employed in temporary labor schemes.
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H. Discussion about the Administrative "Insolvency"
Law Approach
There are, of course, arguments for and against the administrative
insolvency law approach. Possibly the strongest argument against it is
that if a state enterprise sector is to be truly part of the market econ-
omy, it should be subject to exactly the same regulatory environment
as any other sector. Thus, regulating the financial difficulties and in-
solvencies of state enterprises under different laws and by different
rules discriminates against the general policy. Another strong argu-
ment is that if state enterprises are truly subject to the same economic
forces and the effects which follow from those, appropriate obligations
and responsibilities are imposed on enterprise governance and man-
agement that can only improve the general standards and perform-
ance in the state enterprise sector.
Despite the obvious strengths of these arguments, however, the
most compelling reason in favor of the administrative insolvency law
approach comes from the systemic nature of the present difficulties
confronting a large element of the state enterprise sector in China that
are historical and inherited problems. The difficulties faced by the
average state enterprise, even now (and despite the ten years or so of
economic and structural change) cannot be individualized (as, for ex-
ample, being a fault of management) nor attributed to economic cy-
cles that from time to time afflict a market economy system. The
difficulties, plainly, are the product of the previous system. Put sim-
ply, the welfare burdens came in return for relatively cheap labor; sub-
sidies and policy loans came from central planning; unmarketable
products came from command economy planning; general inefficiency
has resulted from a noncompetitive environment; obsolete equipment
was the product of a fusion of some of those factors; and the internal-
ized fraternity system within the state enterprise sector produced tri-
angular debt. This inheritance cannot be conveniently nor
successfully addressed by a traditional form of insolvency law.
When comparing an alternative approach utilized by China to the
administrative precedents used by India and Germany, it may fairly be
said that the application of the Indian legislation has not been a dra-
matic success, while the German model, which was the product of a
crisis, would not be suited to the gradualist approach of state enter-
prise reform in China.
If there is a political will and energy, however, the administrative
approach can succeed. Although it would have to be something con-
siderably more than that which has been evidenced in India, the en-
ergy and effectiveness of the merger, conglomeration, and liquidation
administrative processes carried out by the Treuhandanstalt provide a
very instructive model for possible adoption in China.
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The biggest difficulty that might arise against the adoption of this
type of administrative measure in China is that it may be seen as a
return to the direct administrative control of the now time-distanced
command economy. But the proposal would involve much more than
a bare set of administrative directives that changed from time to time
under the command economy regime. It would require the enactment
of a comprehensive law that would give appropriate power to an in-
dependent administrative unit to deal with a specified section of the
state enterprise sector, a section that was clearly incapable of surviv-
ing in a competitive economy. This would give credence to the "gov-
ernment by laws" ideology that is most important for the reform
process in China.
Finally, it may be suggested that this type of law is not an insolvency
law. The Indian and German laws are rarely mentioned as "insol-
vency" laws. They are not even referred to in the context of insol-
vency, but are more likely to be categorized as an extreme form of
economic interventionist law, peculiar to time and place. The author,
however, disagrees with that assessment. There are just as many ex-
amples of insolvency law as there are of the more traditional type.
Even fully developed market economies have experienced the phe-
nomenon of the extraordinary type of administrative moratorium or
rehabilitation legislation that has sometimes resulted from particular
economic circumstances (similar to what most countries experienced
during the Great Depression and at other times in various economic
sectors, such as agriculture and other industries). These administra-
tive procedures can all be categorized, at least, as laws relating to in-
solvency, if not insolvency laws per se.
There can be no "conclusions" to these Remarks, at least as to
China. We must walt to see what the Chinese government decides.
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